We propose a symmetric key homomorphic encryption scheme based on the evaluation of multivariate polynomials over a finite field. The proposed scheme is somewhat homomorphic with respect to addition and multiplication. Further, we define a generalization of the Learning with Errors problem called the Hidden Subspace Membership problem and show that the semantic security of the proposed scheme can be reduced to the hardness of this problem.
I. Introduction
An encryption scheme is homomorphic for a set of functions if the encrypted evaluations of these functions can be obtained from the encrypted data without decryption. A scheme is called fully homomorphic if functions with an arbitrary number of additions and multiplications can be homomorphically evaluated. If the number of additions and multiplications is limited, then the scheme is said to be somewhat homomorphic. Homomorphic encryption has wide applications in multiparty computation [1] , secure electronic voting [2] , private information retrieval [3] etc.
The first feasible construction of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme was proposed in [4] . This scheme is based on ideal lattices and uses the concept of bootstrapping to convert a somewhat homomorphic scheme to a fully homomorphic one. As an alternative to bootstrapping, a number of lattice based schemes were proposed [5] - [9] depending on the hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [10] , [11] . Lattice based cryptography uses hard computational problems on lattices as the building block of a secure cryptographic scheme [12] , [13] . The most well known computational problem on lattices is the Shortest Vector Problem(SVP) and there exists several reductions of LWE from SVP in the literature [10] , [15] , [16] .
A multivariate polynomial based encryption scheme depends on the difficulty of solving a system of non-linear equations over a finite field. Polly Cracker schemes [17] , [18] were attempts at constructing homomorphic encryption schemes using multivariate polynomials. The security of these schemes depends on the Ideal Membership Problem and relies on the hardness of computing a Gröbner basis for an ideal. These schemes, however, are vulnerable to Linear Algebra-based attacks and attacks using efficient Gröbner basis construction algorithms [18] , [19] . Attempts have been made to overcome these vulnerabilities with the addition of noise as proposed in [20] , [21] .
In this paper, we propose a multivariate polynomial based homomorphic encryption scheme. The encryption process involves noisily evaluating a multivariate polynomial at a set of secret points and adding the scaled plaintext bit to each of these evaluations. The polynomial is randomly chosen from a secret ideal. In order to prove the security of the scheme, we have defined a generalization of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [10] , [11] called the Hidden Subspace Membership (HSM) problem and have shown that the semantic security of the proposed scheme can be reduced to the hardness of this problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II contains the preliminaries for the proposed work. Section III contains the construction of the proposed scheme. In section IV, we discuss the homomorphic properties of the scheme and section V deals with the analysis of its security.
The following notations are used in the paper. λ denotes the security parameter. Z and N denote the set of integers and natural numbers respectively. Given a set S, x $ ← S means that x is sampled uniformly at random from S. For a real number x, ⌊x⌋, ⌈x⌉ and ⌊x⌉ denote the rounding of x down, up or to the nearest integer of x. Z q denotes the set of integers in the interval (− q 2 , q 2 ]. F q denotes a finite field of cardinality q, where q is a prime integer. It represents the elements in the interval − q 2 , q 2 . F q [x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ] ≤r denotes the set of polynomials in x 1 , . . . , x ℓ with coefficients in F q of degree ≤ r. Given a set of points {z i ∈ F ℓ q } 1≤i≤n and a polynomial f ∈ F q [x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ] ≤r , f (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ F n q denotes the evaluation of f at these points. We use uppercase bold letters A, B, . . . to denote matrices and lowercase bold letters a, b, . . . to denote vectors. The Euclidean norm of a vector v is denoted by v and the inner product of two vectors v 1 , v 2 is denoted
x c for all x > n c .
II. Hidden Subspace Membership
The Hidden Subspace membership (HSM) problem involves distinguishing a random vector from a noisy vector of a given subspace S. We use the game playing framework adopted from [22] to formally define the HSM problem.
Definition 1. (Hidden Subspace Membership).
Let S be an l dimensional subspace of the vector space V := F n q , for some n, q ∈ N and l ≥ 1, such that q is prime and let N be a noise distribution on F n q . Then, the HSM problem denoted as HSM n,q,N can be defined in terms of the game shown in Figure 1 . A PPT adversary A wins the game if it can guess the value of β with a non-negligible advantage, given by
This problem can be seen as a generalization of the Decisional Learning with Errors (DLWE) problem which is defined as follows:
Definition 2. (Decisional Learning With Errors).
Given a noise distribution X on Z q and an integer q = q(λ), the DLWE problem can be defined in terms of the game shown in Figure 2 . A PPT adversary A wins the game if it can guess the value of β with a non-negligible advantage given by 
can be written as:
which is a noisy equation with the noise being sampled from the distribution X on Z q . Hence, the DLWE problem can be seen as an instance of the HSM problem where the subspace is (s, 1) ⊥ ⊆ Z n q and the noise is added only to the last element of the vector. The above discussion is formalized in terms of the following lemma.
. Let X be a zero mean distribution on Z q and let N := (0 X ), where 0 ∈ Z n q . Then, any PPT adversary A against the HSM problem HSM n+1,q,N can be transformed into a PPT adversary B against the LWE problem DLWE n,q,X such that
Proof. We construct an adversary B against DLWE n,q,X from an adversary A against HSM n+1,q,N . Observe that, an HSM sample Thus solving the LWE problem over Z n q is equivalent to solving the HSM problem over Z n+1 q for a subspace of dimension n, where only the last entry is affected by noise.
Definition 3. (Discrete Gaussian distribution).
For α > 0 and for q = q(λ), the density function of a Gaussian distribution Ψ α over R is given by,
Then, the discrete Gaussian distribution Ψ α on Z q is the distribution with mean zero and standard deviation αq, obtained by sampling an element x ← D α and outputting ⌊x · q⌉ mod q.
When the noise is sampled according to the distribution Ψ α with αq ≥ 2 √ n, there exists a quantum reduction from the decisional variant of the shortest vector problem (GAPSVP) to the LWE problem [10] . A classical reduction has also been proposed in [15] .
We assume that the HSM problem is hard for an l-dimensional subspace of an n-dimensional space when n − l entries are corrupted by noise sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution. (The justification for this assumption and a detained analysis of the hardness of the HSM problem will be given in the complete paper.)
III. The Proposed Scheme
Consider an ideal I of the polynomial ring F q [x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ], where q is polynomial in the secu-rity parameter λ. Let I ≤r denotes the set of polynomials in I with degree ≤ r. F q [x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ] ≤r is a vector space over F q of dimension N := ℓ+r r and I ≤r is a subspace of this vector space. Let dim(I ≤r ) be the dimension of this subspace. A polynomial f ∈ F q [x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ] ≤r evaluated at all points of F ℓ q generates a vector in F q ℓ q . The set of such vectors obtained by evaluating all polynomials in
Evaluating polynomials in I ≤r gives us a dim(I ≤r )-dimensional subspace V I ≤r . The ciphertext size n is chosen such that n is polynomial in λ but is significantly less than q and dim(I ≤r ) < n ≤ N . We then choose n distinct points {z 1 , . . . , z n } ∈ F ℓ q which satisfy the following conditions: 1) Every vector in F n q can be got by evaluating a polynomial in F q [x 1 , . . . , x ℓ ] ≤r at (z 1 , . . . , z n ).
2) Every vector in F dim(I ≤r ) q can be got by evaluating a polynomial in I ≤r at (z 1 , . . . , z dim(I ≤r ) ). The conditions imposed on (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ensure that for every given vector
Let v i ∈ F N q be the vector obtained by evaluating the monomials of degree ≤ r at the point
be a polynomial, sampled uniformly at random from I ≤r . If f ∈ F N q denotes the coefficient vector of f , then f (z 1 , . . . , z n ) = G · f ∈ F n q . Let us now consider an example to illustrate the construction of G. For ℓ = 2, r = 2 and N = 6, the monomials of F q [x 1 , x 2 ] ≤2 according to the lexicographic order are {1, x 1 , x 2 , x 2 1 , x 1 x 2 , x 2 2 }. If n = 3, then let z 1 = (z 11 , z 21 ), z 2 = (z 12 , z 22 ), z 3 = (z 13 , z 23 ) be 3 distinct points in F 2 q . Then, G ∈ F 3×6 q represents the following matrix: 
The proposed encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms. The plaintext space is {0, 1} and the ciphertexts are vectors of order n over F q . Let X be a noise distribution that samples its entries from the discrete Gaussian distribution Ψ α on Z q . . Choose a vector s = (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ (V I ≤r ) ⊥ and a constant p ∈ N such that, if σ s := n i=1 s i denotes the sum of the elements of s and e denotes a vector of order n whose entries are sampled from the distribution X , then η(αq) < σ s · p < ⌊q/2⌋ and the distribution of s, e has a standard deviation < t(αq), where η and t are constants that depend on the probability of decryption error and the number of homomorphic operations. The secret key is a basis for the ideal I and the set of points {z 1 , . . . , z n }. If the choice of I is restricted to a radical ideal whose variety has a finite number of points, then the ideal can also be expressed in terms of its variety. 
• Decrypt(sk, c): Given the ciphertext c, the plaintext m can be recovered as
Remark 1. This scheme can also be seen as a coding theory based scheme. If the polynomial chosen in the above encryption scheme is f , then the ciphertext can be seen as a noisy punctured Reed-Muller encoding of the polynomial f + m.
1) Correctness of Decryption.:
Since s ∈ (V ≤r ) ⊥ , s, Gf = 0 (mod q). Therefore,
then, the probability of decryption error is at most ǫ. In other words, the decryption function will output the correct message with probability 1 − ǫ. Since the entries of e are sampled from the distribution X , then by definition we have e i ≡ ⌊q · y i ⌉ mod q where y i is sampled independently from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation α
Hence, if y := (y 1 , . . . , y n−k ), then e − q · y ≤ √ n−k 2 . Since | s 2 , y | is a Gaussian variable with mean 0 and standard deviation s 2 α, by the tail inequality on Gaussian variables, we have P r | s 2 , y | > s 2 αω( log (n − k)) ≤ ǫ(n − k) (10) where ǫ(n − k) is a negligible function in n − k. Using the triangle inequality, we have
Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have with overwhelming probability
Hence, the parameters should be chosen in such a way that the error term given by equation (12) is less than q/4. For the case when only additive homomorphism is required, we can choose s = (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ (V I ≤r ) ⊥ such that s 2 is of the form s 2 = (0, . . . , 0, 1). Then s, e will just be equal to the last entry of e. However as we will see in the subsequent section that this may not be possible when multiplicative homomorphism is required.
IV. Homomorphic Properties
If φ : {0, 1} t → {0, 1} denotes a function to be performed on the plaintexts m 1 , . . . , m t , then homomorphically evaluating φ involves calculating a new ciphertext c eval such that Dec(c eval , sk) = φ(m 1 , . . . , m t ). Any function φ involving binary variables can be evaluated using a set of addition and multiplication gates. The remainder of this section analyses homomorphic addition and multiplication of ciphertexts in the proposed scheme.
A. Addition.
Given two ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 of the respective plaintexts m 1 and m 2 , where c 1 = M 1 ·1+ G ·f 1 + e 1 and c 2 = M 2 · 1 + G · f 2 + e 2 , homomorphic addition of m 1 and m 2 can be performed by computing
Since s, G(f 1 + f 2 ) = 0 (mod q) and given that, M i = m i · p and e i = (0, e i ) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where e i is a vector of order n − dim(I ≤r ) and its entries are sampled from the distribution X , we have If e add := s 2 , e 1 + e 2 (mod q), then c add decrypts correctly to (m 1 + m 2 ) mod 2 as long as (m 1 + m 2 ) · σ s p < ⌊q/2⌋ and |eadd| < ⌊(σs · p)/2⌋. The distribution of e add is Gaussian with a standard deviation √ 2 s 2 αq. It can be easily verified that due to the increase in the standard deviation after addition, the probability of decryption error increases by a factor of 2.
B. Multiplication.
Multiplication is based on the fact that, given two polynomials
where deg(f 1 f 2 ) ≤ 2r. Therefore, f 1 f 2 ∈ I but it is not an element of the subspace I ≤r . In order to do homomorphic multiplication, n must be greater than the dimension of V I ≤2r and the vector s = (s 1 , s 2 ) must be an element of (VI ≤2r ) ⊥ such that
. The noise must be added to the last n − dim(I ≤r ) entries.
Given two ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 , the homomorphic multiplication of its respective plaintexts m 1 and m 2 can be obtained by taking the component-wise product of c 1 and c 2 . In order to maintain the invariant structure s, c = m · (σ s p) + s 2 , e for decryption, we multiply the product by 1/p. Specifically, if c 1 = M 1 · 1 + G · f 1 + e 1 and c 2 = M 2 · 1 + G · f 2 + e 2 , then
where ⊙ denotes the component-wise product of two vectors. Given that, M i = m i · p and e i = (0, e i ) for i ∈ {1, 2}, where e i is a vector of order n − dim(I ≤r ) and its entries are sampled from the distribution X ,
then c mult decrypts correctly to m 1 m 2 as long as |emult| < ⌊(σs · p)/2⌋, where e mult is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation
While homomorphic addition does not impose any constraints on the ciphertext size, it does lead to an increase in noise. This limits the number of additions possible. Homomorphic multiplication introduces more noise than addition and the size of the ciphertext increases significantly with the number of multiplications possible. The increase in noise by homomorphic operations can be countered by techniques such as modulus switching [6] , [7] . Countering the increase in ciphertext size for homomorphic multiplication remains a challenge.
V. Security
We show that the proposed scheme is semantically secure based on the hardness of the Hidden Subspace Membership problem. In a Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) model, the adversary has a number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs at its disposal. A symmetric key encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure or indistinguishable under a chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) if, given sufficient samples (plaintext-ciphertext pairs), no adversary can distinguish between the encryptions of 0 from the encryptions of messages of its choice with probability more than 1 2 . Definition 4. (IND-CPA Security) . The IND-CPA security of a symmetric encryption scheme can be defined in terms of the game shown in Figure 3 It is clear from the construction of the scheme that the encryptions of 0 are noisy elements of the subspace V I ≤r ⊆ F n q . Therefore, distinguishing an encryption of 0 from the encryption of a random message is equivalent to solving the HSM problem as shown in the following theorem. If the sample obtained from the Challenge oracle of HSM is a noisy element of S, then A runs in a similar environment to that of the IND-CPA game and hence, B outputs β with probability 1 2 + ǫ. On the other hand, if the sample returned is uniform in F n q , then B outputs β with probability 1 2 . Therefore, the probability that B solves the HSM problem is ≥ 1 2 + ǫ 2 . Hence, the advantage of B in solving the HSM problem is ≥ ǫ 2 .
VI. Conclusions
A symmetric key homomorphic encryption scheme has been proposed based on the evaluation of multivariate polynomials. The security of the scheme is based on the hardness of the Hidden Subspace Membership problem. In its current form, the scheme is somewhat homomorphic and for a given ciphertext size, can perform a limited number of homomoprhic additions and multiplications. Future work includes converting the scheme into a fully homomorphic one and designing a public key variant of the same.
